Suchergebnisse

This dissertation studies the interaction between financial markets and political institutions in a historical context. The body of this dissertation consists of four chapters in the fields of monetary and financial history. Chapter 2 concerns the history of the Russian rouble between 1856 and 1875. This chapter's main question is to what extent the Russian government was able to credibly stabilise its currency in the aftermath of the Crimean War. This chapter shows that foreign bondholders never saw currency reforms by the Tsarist government as fully credible. Chapter 3 concerns the gold standard, the main monetary regime between 1870 and 1914. This chapter studies why countries did or did not adopt the gold standard. Its main result is that countries that had more democratic institutions were, all else equal, less likely to do so. Chapter 4 studies the effects of the introduction of the corporate tax (Vennootschapsbelasting) in the occupied Netherlands in 1942. This chapter shows that the introduction of this tax cost Dutch shareholders over 200 million guilders. Furthermore, firms responded to this tax by attracting additional debt, thus avoiding part of the tax burden. Chapter 5 studies the remuneration of members of Canadian parliaments in the second half of the twentieth century. The main research question is how politicians respond to changes to their remuneration. This chapter shows that the introduction of pension schemes for members of parliament enticed them to remain in office longer, or at least to try to do so by running for re-election.

Zsfassung in niederländ. Sprache

We study how political institutions affected the decision of countries to adhere to the classical gold standard. Using a variety of econometric techniques and controlling for a wide range of relevant economic and political factors, we find that the probability of adherence to the gold standard before World War I was ceteris paribus lower for countries which were more democratic. This effect can be linked to how open the political process was to different segments of the population and the extent of political competition resulting from that. The effect was particularly relevant for peripheral countries and it influenced both the decision of countries to adopt the gold standard as well as the decision to suspend it.

We study how domestic politics affected the decisions of countries to adhere to the classical gold standard. Using a variety of econometric techniques and controlling for a wide range of economic factors, we demonstrate that political constraints were important in the decision of countries to adopt the gold standard as well as in the decision to suspend it. Specifically we find that the probability of adherence to the gold standard was ceteris paribus lower for countries in which domestic politics were organized in a more open and democratic fashion. This effect appears to be driven largely by the extent of domestic political competition and was particularly relevant for peripheral countries.

With asset liability management (ALM), all the relevant asset and liability classes are managed in an integrated fashion. We describe an ALM model for housing associations. This model uses simulation to show the development of a housing association, usually measured as solvency and profitability, dependent on both internal (strategy) and external (economy) factors. In order to assess the associations' risk and return profile, we generate a large number of economic scenarios. Furthermore, we will show the pitfalls of just using one or a few scenarios. Finally, we will show how this model can be used to obtain insight into the influence and effectiveness of specific instruments.

We use data from Canadian legislatures to examine how legislative pension rules affect the propensity of incumbents to seek re‐election. We predict that legislators with defined‐benefits pensions are more likely to seek re‐election than legislators without pensions. Once the legislator is vested (i.e., qualified) in the pension, however, this incentive disappears; indeed, pensions that accrue value quickly and can be collected at an early age, induce legislators to retire rather than seek re‐election. Difference‐in‐differences estimates bear out these predictions: on average, legislators with defined benefits pensions are 11 percentage points more likely to seek re‐election than legislators without pensions, whereas legislators who on vesting immediately qualify for a pension of 50% of their salary are 11 percentage points less likely to do so. These results show that legislative pensions alter the value that legislators place on re‐election and, in doing so, they affect the accumulation of legislative professionalism and the strength of democratic accountability.

AbstractWe examine the Netherlands around the Second World War, where the occupying Nazi regime overhauled the country's corporate tax regime and introduced a profit tax of 55 per cent. We estimate that the new tax regime cost investors at least 300 million guilders, an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of Dutch GDP in 1940. We demonstrate that the tax introduction changed the financing of Dutch businesses. In particular, we find strong evidence that debt financing increased because it provides a tax shelter. The changes in taxation also led to an after‐tax reduction in the cost of debt, which had large real effects on firm investment. After the end of the war, firms with more leverage had higher capital expenditures.